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Abstract
Even as end-to-end encrypted communication becomes
more popular, private messaging remains a challenging prob-
lem due to metadata leakages, such as who is communicat-
ing with whom. Most existing systems that hide commu-
nication metadata either (1) do not scale easily, (2) incur
significant overheads, or (3) provide weaker guarantees than
cryptographic privacy, such as differential privacy or heuris-
tic privacy. This paper presents XRD (short for Crossroads),
a metadata private messaging system that provides crypto-
graphic privacy, while scaling easily to support more users
by adding more servers. At a high level, XRD uses multiple
mix networks in parallel with several techniques, including
a novel technique we call aggregate hybrid shuffle. As a re-
sult, XRD can support 2 million users with 251 seconds of
latency with 100 servers. This is 12× and 3.7× faster than
Atom and Pung, respectively, which are prior scalable mes-
saging systems with cryptographic privacy.
1 Introduction
Many Internet users today have turned to end-to-end en-
crypted communication like TLS [18] and Signal [36], to
protect the content of their communication in the face of
widespread surveillance. While these techniques are starting
to see wide adoption, they unfortunately do not protect the
metadata of communication, such as the timing, the size, and
the identities of the end-points. In scenarios where the meta-
data are sensitive (e.g., a government officer talking with a
journalist for whistleblowing), encryption alone is not suffi-
cient to protect users’ privacy.
Given its importance, there is a rich history of works
that aim to hide the communication metadata, starting with
mix networks (mix-nets) [10] and dining-cryptographers net-
works (DC-Nets) [11] in the 80s. Both works provide for-
mal privacy guarantees against global adversaries, which
has inspired many systems with strong security guaran-
tees [14, 47, 31, 46]. However, mix-nets and DC-nets re-
quire the users’ messages to be processed by either central-
ized servers or every user in the system, making them dif-
ficult to scale to millions of users. Systems that build on
them typically inherit the scalability limitation as well, with
overheads increasing (often superlinearly) with the number
of users or servers [14, 47, 31, 46]. For private communi-
cation systems, however, supporting a large user base is im-
perative to providing strong security; as aptly stated by prior
works, “anonymity loves company” [20, 42]. Intuitively, the
adversary’s goal of learning information about a user natu-
rally becomes harder as the number of users increases.
As such, many recent messaging systems have been tar-
geting scalability as well as formal security guarantees. Sys-
tems like Stadium [45] and Karaoke [33], for instance, use
differential privacy [22] to bound the information leakage
on the metadata. Though this has allowed the systems to
scale to more users with better performance, both systems
leak a small bounded amount of metadata for each message,
and thus have a notion of “privacy budget”. A user in these
systems then spends a small amount of privacy budget ev-
ery time she sends a sensitive message, and eventually is not
guaranteed strong privacy. Users with high volumes of com-
munication could quickly exhaust this budget, and there is no
clear mechanism to increase the privacy budget once it runs
out. Scalable systems that provide stronger cryptographic
privacy like Atom [30] or Pung [4], on the other hand, do
not have such a privacy budget. However, they rely heav-
ily on expensive cryptographic primitives such as public key
encryption and private information retrieval [2]. As a result,
they suffer from high latency, in the order of ten minutes or
longer for a few million users, which impedes their adoption.
This paper presents a point-to-point metadata private mes-
saging system called XRD that aims to marry the best aspects
of prior systems. Similar to several recent works [4, 30, 45],
XRD scales with the number of servers. At the same time,
the system cryptographically hides all communication meta-
data from an adversary who controls the entire network, a
constant fraction of the servers, and any number of users.
Consequently, it can support virtually unlimited amount of
communication without leaking privacy against such an ad-
versary. Moreover, XRD only uses cryptographic primitives
that are significantly faster than the ones used by prior works,
and can thus provide lower latency and higher throughput
than prior systems with cryptographic security.
In more detail, a XRD deployment consists of many
servers. These servers are organized into many small chains,
each of which acts as a local mix-net. Before any commu-
nication, each user creates a mailbox that is uniquely as-
sociated with her, akin to an e-mail address. In order for
two users Alice and Bob to have a conversation in the sys-
tem, they first pick a number of chains using a specific al-
gorithm that XRD provides. The algorithm guarantees that
every pair of users intersects at one of the chains. Then,
Alice and Bob send messages addressed to their own mail-
boxes to all chosen chains, except to the chain where their
choices of chains align, where they send their messages for
each other. Once all users submit their messages, each chain
shuffles and decrypts the messages, and forwards the shuf-
fled messages to the appropriate mailboxes. Intuitively, XRD
protects the communication metadata because (1) every pair
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of users meets at a chain which makes it equally likely for
any pair of users to be communicating, and (2) the mix-net
chains hide whether a user sent a message to another user or
herself.
One of the main challenges ofXRD is addressing active at-
tacks by malicious servers, where they tamper with some of
the users’ messages. This challenge is not new to our system,
and several prior works have employed expensive crypto-
graphic primitives like verifiable shuffle [14, 47, 31, 45, 30]
or incurred significant bandwidth overheads [30] to prevent
such attacks. In XRD, we instead propose a new technique
called aggregate hybrid shuffle that can verify the correctness
of shuffling using only efficient cryptographic techniques.
XRD has two significant drawbacks compared to prior sys-
tems. First, with N servers, each user must send O(
√
N)
messages in order to ensure that every pair of users inter-
sects. Second, because each user sends O(
√
N) messages,
the workload of each XRD server is O(M/
√
N) for M users,
rather than O(M/N) like most prior scalable messaging sys-
tems [4, 30, 45]. Thus, prior systems could outperform XRD
in deployment scenarios with large numbers of servers and
users, since the cost of adding a single user is higher and
adding servers is not as beneficial in XRD.
Nevertheless, our evaluation suggests that XRD outper-
forms prior systems with cryptographic guarantees if there
are less than a few thousand servers in the network. XRD
can handle 2 million users (comparable to the number of
daily Tor users [1]) in 251 seconds with 100 servers. For
Atom [30] and Pung [4, 3], two prior scalable messaging
systems with cryptographic privacy, it would take over 50
minutes and 15 minutes, respectively. (These systems, how-
ever, can defend against stronger adversaries, as we detail in
§2 and §8.) Moreover, the performance gap grows with more
users, and we estimate that Atom and Pung require at least
1,000 servers in the network to achieve comparable latency
with 2 million or more users. While promising, we find that
XRD is not as fast as systems with weaker security guaran-
tees: Stadium [45] and Karaoke [33], for example, would
be 3.3× and 25× faster than XRD, respectively, in the same
deployment scenario. In terms of user costs, we estimate
that 40 Kbps of bandwidth is sufficient for users in a XRD
network with 2,000 servers, and the bandwidth requirement
scales down to 1 Kbps with 100 servers.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Design and analyze XRD, a metadata private messaging
system that can scale by distributing the workload across
many servers while providing cryptographic privacy.
• Design a technique called aggregate hybrid shuffle that
can efficiently protect users’ privacy under active attacks.
• Implement and evaluate a prototype of XRD on a net-
work of commodity servers, and show that XRD outper-
forms existing cryptographically secure designs.
2 Related work
In this section, we discuss related work by categorizing
the prior systems primarily by their privacy properties, and
also discuss the scalability and performance of each system.
Systems with cryptographic privacy. Mix-nets [10] and
DC-Nets [11] are the earliest examples of works that provide
cryptographic (or even information theoretic) privacy guar-
antees against global adversaries. Unfortunately, they have
two major issues. First, they are weak against active attack-
ers: adversaries can deanonymize users in mix-nets by tam-
pering with messages, and can anonymously deny service in
DC-Nets. Second, they do not scale to large numbers of users
because all messages must be processed by either a small
number of servers or every user in the system. Many systems
that improved on the security of these systems against active
attacks [14, 47, 31, 46] suffer from similar scalability bottle-
necks. Riposte [13], a system that uses “private information
storage” to provide anonymous broadcast, also requires all
servers to handle a number of messages proportional to the
number of users, and thus faces similar scalability issues.
A recent system Atom [30] targets both scalability and
strong anonymity. Specifically, Atom can scale horizon-
tally, allowing it to scale to larger numbers of users simply
by adding more servers to the network. At the same time,
it provides sender anonymity [40] (i.e., no one, including
the recipients, learns who sent which message) against an
adversary that can compromise any fraction of the servers
and users. However, Atom employs expensive cryptography,
and requires the message to be routed through hundreds of
servers in series. Thus, Atom incurs high latency, in the or-
der of tens of minutes for a few million users.
Pung [4, 3] is a system that aims to provide metadata pri-
vate messaging between honest users with cryptographic pri-
vacy. This is a weaker notion of privacy than that of Atom,
as the recipients (who are assumed to be honest) learn the
senders of the messages. However, unlike most prior works,
Pung can provide private communication even if all servers
are malicious by using a cryptographic primitive called com-
putational private information retrieval (CPIR) [12, 2]. Its
powerful threat model comes unfortunately at the cost of per-
formance: Though Pung scales horizontally, the amount of
work required per user is proportional to the total number of
users, resulting in the total work growing superlinearly with
the number of users. Moreover, PIR is computationally ex-
pensive, resulting in throughput of only a few hundred or
thousand messages per minute per server.
Systems with differential privacy. Vuvuzela [46] and its
horizontally scalable siblings Stadium [45] and Karaoke [33]
aim to provide differentially private (rather than crypto-
graphically private) messaging. At a high level, they hide the
communication patterns of honest users by inserting dummy
messages that are indistinguishable from real messages, and
reason carefully about how much information is leaked at
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each round. They then set the system parameters such that
they could support a number of sensitive messages; for in-
stance, Stadium and Karaoke target 104 and 106 messages,
respectively. Up to that number of messages, the systems al-
low users to provide a plausible cover story to “deny” their
actual actions. Specifically, the system ensures that the prob-
ability of Alice conversing with Bob from the adversary’s
perspective is within eε (typically, eε ∈ [3,10]) of the prob-
ability of Alice conversing with any other user with only
a small failure probability δ (typically, δ = 0.0001). This
paradigm shift has allowed the systems to support larger
numbers of users with lower latency than prior works.
Unfortunately, systems with differential privacy suffer
from two drawbacks. First, the probability gap between two
events may be sufficient for strong adversaries to act on. For
instance, if Alice is ten times as likely to talk to Bob than
Charlie, the adversary may act assuming that Alice is talking
to Bob, despite the plausible deniability. Second, there is a
“privacy budget” (e.g., 104 to 106 messages), meaning that
a user can deny a limited number of messages with strong
guarantees. Moreover, for best possible security, users must
constantly send messages, and deny every message. For in-
stance, Alice may admit that she is not in any conversation
(thinking this information is not sensitive), but this could
have unintended consequences on the privacy of another user
who uses the cover story that she is talking with Alice. The
budget could then run out quickly if users want the strongest
privacy possible: If a user sends a message every minute, she
would run out of her budget in a few days or years with 104
to 106 messages. Although the privacy guarantee weakens
gradually after the privacy budget is exhausted, it is unclear
how to raise the privacy levels once they have been lowered.
Scalable systems with other privacy guarantees. The only
private communication system in wide-deployment today is
Tor [21]. Tor currently supports over 2 million daily users
using over 6,000 servers [1], and can scale to more users
easily by adding more servers. However, Tor does not pro-
vide privacy against an adversary that monitors significant
portions of the network, and is susceptible to traffic analy-
sis attacks [19, 28]. Its privacy guarantee weakens further if
the adversary can control some servers, and if the adversary
launches active attacks [27]. Similar to Tor, most free-route
mix-nets [38, 23, 42, 15, 35] (distributed mix-nets where
each messages is routed through a small subset of servers)
cannot provide strong privacy against powerful adversaries
due to traffic analysis and active attacks.
Loopix [41] is a recent iteration on free-route mix-nets,
and can provide fast asynchronous messaging. To do so, each
user interacts with a semi-trusted server (called “provider” in
the paper), and routes her messages through a small number
of servers (e.g., 3 servers). Each server inserts small amounts
of random delays before routing the messages. Loopix then
reasons about privacy using entropy. Unfortunately, the pri-
vacy guarantee of Loopix weakens quickly as the adversary
compromises more servers. Moreover, Loopix requires the
recipients to trust the provider to protect themselves.
3 System model and goals
XRD aims to achieve the best of all worlds by providing
cryptographic metadata privacy while scaling horizontally
without relying on expensive cryptographic primitives. In
this section, we present our threat model and system goals.
3.1 Threat model and assumptions
A deployment of XRD would consist of hundreds to thou-
sands of servers and a large number of users, in the order
of millions. Similar to several prior works on distributed
private communication systems [30, 45], XRD assumes an
adversary that can monitor the entire network, control a frac-
tion f of the servers, and control up to all but two honest
users. We assume, however, that there exists a public key
infrastructure that can be used to securely share public keys
of online servers and users with all participants at any given
time. These keys, for example, could be maintained by key
transparency schemes [32, 37, 44].
XRD does not hide the fact that users are using XRD.
Thus, for best possible security, users should stay online to
avoid intersection attacks [29, 16]. XRD also does not pro-
tect against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and in general
does not provide strong availability guarantees. Defending
against intersection and DoS attacks is an interesting future
work. XRD does, however, provide privacy even under DoS,
server churn, and user churn (e.g., Alice goes offline unex-
pectedly without her conversation partner knowing). We dis-
cuss the availability properties further in §5 and §8.3.
Finally, XRD assumes that the users can agree to start talk-
ing at a certain time out-of-band. This could be done, for ex-
ample, via two users exchanging this information offline, or
by using systems like Alpenhorn [34] that can initiate con-
versations privately.
Cryptographic primitives. XRD uses standard crypto-
graphic primitives. It assumes existence of a group of prime
order p with a generator g in which discrete log is hard
and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. We
will write DH(ga,b) = gab to denote Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change. In addition, XRD makes use of authenticated en-
cryption.
Authenticated encryption [5]: XRD relies on an authen-
ticated encryption scheme for confidentiality and integrity,
which consists of the following algorithms:
• c← AEnc(s,nonce,m). Encrypt message m and authen-
ticate the ciphertext c using a symmetric key s and a
nonce nonce. Typically, s is used to derive two more
keys, one for encryption and one for authentication (e.g.,
via HMAC).
• (b,m)← ADec(s,nonce,c). Check the integrity of and
decrypt ciphertext c using the key s and a nonce nonce.
3
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Figure 1: Overview of XRD operation.
If the check fails, then b = 0 and m = ⊥. Otherwise,
b = 1 and m is the underlying plaintext.
XRD in particular relies on the following events having
negligible probability when using authenticated encryption:
(1) generating a correctly authenticated ciphertext without
knowing the secret key used for ADec, and (2) the same
ciphertext authenticating under two different keys. Both
of these properties are true, for example, when using the
encrypt-then-MAC authenticated encryption schemes.
3.2 Goals
XRD has three main goals.
Correctness. Informally, the system is correct if every hon-
est user successfully communicates with her conversation
partner after a successful execution of the system protocol.
Privacy. Similar to prior messaging systems [46, 4, 45,
33], XRD aims to provide relationship unobservability [40],
meaning that the adversary cannot learn anything about the
communication between two honest users. Informally, con-
sider any honest users Alice, Bob, and Charlie. The system
provides privacy if the adversary cannot distinguish whether
Alice is communicating with Bob, Charlie, or neither. XRD
only guarantees this property among the honest users, as ma-
licious conversation partners can trivially learn the metadata
of their communication. We provide a more formal defini-
tion in Appendix B. (This is a weaker privacy goal than that
of Atom [30], which aims for sender anonymity.)
Scalability. Similar to prior work [30], we require that the
system can handle more users with more servers. If the
number of messages processed by a server is C(M,N) for M
users and N servers, we require that C(M,N)→ 0 as N→∞.
C(M,N) should approach zero polynomially in N so that
adding a server introduces significant performance benefits.
4 XRD overview
Figure 1 presents the overview of a XRD network. At a
high level, XRD consists of three different entities: users,
mix servers, and mailbox servers. Every user in XRD has
a unique mailbox associated with her, similar to an e-mail
address. The mailbox servers maintain the mailboxes, and
are only trusted for availability and not privacy.
To set up the network, XRD organizes the mix servers into
many chains of servers such that there exists at least one hon-
est server in each chain with overwhelming probability (i.e.,
an anytrust group [47]). Communication in XRD is carried
out in discrete rounds. In each round, each user selects a
fixed set of ` chains, where the set is determined by the user’s
public key. She then sends a fixed size message to each of
the selected chains. (If the message is too small or large, then
the user pads the message or breaks it into multiple pieces.)
Each message contains a destination mailbox, and is onion-
encrypted for all servers in the chain.
Once all users’ messages are submitted, each chain acts
as a local mix-net [10], decrypting and shuffling messages.
During shuffling, each server also generates a short proof
that allows other servers to check that it behaved correctly.
If the proof does not verify, then the protocol halts with no
privacy leakage. If all verification succeeds, then the last
server in each chain forwards the messages to the appropriate
mailbox servers. (The protocol is described in detail in §6.)
Finally, the mailbox servers put the messages into the appro-
priate mailboxes, and each user downloads all messages in
her mailbox at the end of a round.
The correctness and security of XRD is in large part due
to how each user selects the mix-nets and the destination of
each message. As we will see in §5, the users are required
to follow a specific algorithm to select the chains. The algo-
rithm guarantees that every pair of users have at least one
chain in common and the choices of the chains are pub-
licly computable. For example, every user selecting the same
chain will achieve this property, and thus correctness and se-
curity. In XRD, we achieve this property while distributing
the load evenly.
Let us now consider two scenarios: (1) a user Alice is not
in a conversation with anyone, or (2) Alice is in a conver-
sation with another user Bob. In the first case, she sends a
dummy message encrypted for herself to each chain that will
come back to her own mailbox. We call these messages loop-
back messages. In the second case, Alice and Bob compute
each other’s choices of chains, and discover at which chain
they will intersect. If there are multiple such chains, they
break ties in a deterministic fashion. Then, Alice and Bob
send the messages encrypted for the other person, which we
call conversation messages, to their intersecting chain. They
also send loopback messages on all other chains.
4.1 Security properties
We now argue the security informally. We present a more
formal definition and arguments of privacy in Appendix B.
Since both types of messages are encrypted for owners of
mailboxes and the mix-net hides the origin of a message, the
adversary cannot tell if a message going to Alice’s mailbox
is a loopback message or a conversation message sent by a
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different user. This means that the network pattern of all
users is the same from the adversary’s perspective: each user
sends and receives exactly ` messages, each of which could
be a loopback or a conversation message. As a result, the
adversary cannot tell if a user is in a conversation or not.
Moreover, we choose the chains such that every pair of users
intersects at some chain (§5), meaning the probability that
Alice is talking to another honest user is the same for all
honest users. This hides the conversation metadata.
The analysis above, however, only holds if the adversary
does not tamper with the messages. For instance, if the ad-
versary drops Alice’s message in a chain, then there are two
possible observable outcomes in this chain: Alice receives
(1) no message, meaning Alice is not in a conversation in
this chain, or (2) one message, meaning someone intersect-
ing with Alice at this chain is chatting with Alice. This in-
formation leakage breaks the security of XRD. We propose
a new protocol called aggregate hybrid shuffle (§6) that effi-
ciently defends against such an attack.
4.2 Scalability properties
Let n and N be the number of chains and servers in the
network, respectively. Each user must send at least
√
n mes-
sages to guarantee every pair of users intersect. To see why,
fix `, the number of chains a user selects. Those chains must
connect a user Alice to all M users. Since the total number
of messages sent by users is M · `, each chain should handle
M·`
n messages if we distribute the load evenly. We then need
M·`
n · `≥M because the left hand side is the maximum num-
ber of users connected to the chains that Alice chose. Thus,
` ≥ √n. In §5, we present an approximation algorithm that
uses ` ≈ √2n to ensure all users intersect with each other
while evenly distributing the work. This means that each
chain handles ≈
√
2M√
n messages, and thus XRD scales with
the number of chains. If we set n = N and each server ap-
pears in k chains for k <<
√
N, this satisfies our scalability
goal in §3.2: C(M,N) = k
√
2M√
N
→ 0 polynomially as N→ ∞.
We show that k is logarithmic in N in §5.2.1.
5 XRD design
In this section, we present the detailed operations of a base
XRD design that protects against an adversary that does not
launch active attacks. We then describe modifications to this
baseline design that allows XRD to protect against active at-
tacks in §6.
5.1 Mailboxes and mailbox servers
Every user in XRD has a mailbox that is publicly associ-
ated with her. In our design, we use the public key of each
user as the identifier for the mailbox, though different pub-
lic identifiers like e-mail addresses can work as well. These
mailboxes are maintained by the mailbox servers, with sim-
ple put and get functionalities to add and fetch messages to
Algorithm 1 Mix server routing protocol
Server i in a chain of k servers possesses its mixing key pair
(mpki = gmski ,mski). In each round ρ , it receives a set of ci-
phertexts {c ji = (gx j ,AEnc(DH(mpki,x j),ρ,c ji+1)} for each
user j, either from an upstream server if i 6= 1, or from the
users if i = 1.
1. Decrypt and shuffle: Decrypt each message:
c ji+1 = ADec(DH(g
x j ,mski),ρ,c ji ). Randomly shuffle
{c ji+1}.
2a. Relay messages: If i < k, then send the shuffled {c ji+1}
to server i+1.
2b. Forward messages to mailbox: If i = k, then each de-
crypted message is of the form (pku,AEnc(s,ρ,mu)),
where pku is the public key of a user u, s is a secret key,
and mu is a message for the user. Send the message to
the mailbox server that manages mailbox pku.
a mailbox. Similar to e-mail servers, different users’ mail-
boxes can be maintained by different servers.
5.2 Mix chains
XRD uses many parallel mix-nets to process the messages.
We now describe their formation and operations.
5.2.1 Forming mix chains
We require the existence of an honest server in every chain
to guarantee privacy. To ensure this property, we use public
randomness sources [7, 43] that are unbiased and publicly
available to randomly sample k servers to form a chain, sim-
ilar to prior works [30, 45]. We set k large enough such that
the probability that all servers are malicious is negligible.
Concretely, the probability that a chain of length k consists
only of malicious servers is f k. Then, if we have n chains in
total, the probability there exists a group of only malicious
servers is less than n · f k via a union bound. Finally, we can
upper bound this to be negligible. For example, if we want
this probability to be less than 2−64 for f = 20%, then we
need k = 32 for n < 6000. This makes k depend logarithmi-
cally on N. In XRD, we set n = N for N servers, meaning
each server appears in k chains on average.
Once the servers are selected, we “stagger” the position of
a server in the chains to ensure maximal server utilization.
For instance, if a server is part of two chains, then it could
be the first server in one chain and the second server in the
other chain. This optimization has no impact on the security,
as we only require the existence of an honest server in each
group. This helps minimize the idle time of each server.
5.2.2 Processing user messages
After the chains are created, each mix server i generates a
mixing key pair (mpki = gmski ,mski), where mski is a ran-
dom value in Zp and g is a generator of the group. The pub-
lic mixing keys {mpki} are made available to all participants
in the network, along with the ordering of the keys in each
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chain. Now, each chain behaves as a simple mix-net [10]:
users submit some messages onion-encrypted using the mix-
ing keys (§5.3), and the servers go in order decrypting and
shuffling the messages. Algorithm 1 describes the proto-
col in detail. The honest server in each chain is responsible
for hiding the origins of the messages against passive adver-
saries. We then protect against active attacks using a new
technique described in §6.
5.2.3 Server churn
Some servers may go offline in the middle of a round.
Though XRD does not provide additional fault tolerance
mechanisms, only the chains that contain failing servers are
affected. Furthermore, the failing chains do not affect the se-
curity since they do not disturb the operations of other chains
and the destination of the messages at the failing chain re-
mains hidden to the adversary. Thus, conversations that use
chains with no failing servers are unaffected. We analyze the
empirical effects of server failures in §8.3.
5.3 Users
We now describe how users operate in XRD.
5.3.1 Selecting chains
XRD needs to ensure that all users’ choices of chains in-
tersect at least once, and that the choices are publicly com-
putable. We present a scheme that achieves this property.
Upon joining the network, every user is placed into one of
`+1 groups such that each group contains roughly the same
number of users, and such that the group of any user is pub-
licly computable. This could be done, for example, by as-
signing each user to a pseudo-random group based on the
hash of the user’s public key. Every user in a group is con-
nected to the same ` servers specified as follows. Let Ci
be the ordered set of chains that users in group i are con-
nected to. We start with C1 = {1, . . . , `}, and build the other
sets inductively: For i = 1, . . . , `, group i+ 1 is connected
to Ci+1 = {C1[i],C2[i], . . . ,Ci[i],Ci[`]+1, . . . ,Ci[`]+ (`− i)},
where Cx[y] is the yth entry in Cx.
By construction, every group is connected to every other
group: Group i is connected to group j via Ci[ j] for all i< j.
As a result, every user in group i is connected to all others
in the same group (they meet at all chains in Ci), and is con-
nected to users in group j via chain Ci[ j].
To find the concrete value of `, let us consider C`. The
last chain of C`, which is the chain with the largest index, is
C`[`] = `2−∑`−1i=1 i = `
2+`
2 . This value should be as close as
possible to n, the number of chains, to maximize utilization.
Thus, `= d√2n+0.25−0.5e ≈ d√2ne. Given that ` ≥√n
(§4.2), this is a√2-approximation.
5.3.2 Sending messages
After choosing the ` mix chains, the users send one mes-
sage to each of the chosen chains as described in Algo-
rithm 2. At a high level, if Alice is not talking with anyone,
Alice generates ` loopback messages by encrypting dummy
Algorithm 2 User conversation protocol
Consider two users Alice and Bob with key pairs
(pkA = gskA ,skA) and (pkB = gskB ,skB) who are connected
to sets of ` chains CA and CB (§5.3.1). The network consists
of chains 1, . . . ,n, each with k servers. Alice and Bob pos-
sess the set of mixing keys for each chain. Alice performs
the following in round ρ .
1a. Generate loopback messages: If Alice is not in a con-
versation, then Alice generates ` loopback messages:
mx = (pkA,AEnc(sxA,ρ,0)) for x ∈ CA, where sxA is a
chain-specific symmetric key known only to Alice.
1b. Generate conversation message: If Alice is in a conver-
sation with Bob, then she first computes the shared key
sAB = DH(pkB,skA), and the symmetric encryption key
for Bob sB =KDF(sAB,pkB) where KDF is a key deriva-
tion function. Alice then generates the conversation mes-
sage: mxAB = (pkB,AEnc(sB,ρ,msg)), where msg is the
plaintext message for Bob and xAB ∈CA∩CB is the first
chain in the intersection. She also generates `− 1 loop-
back messages mx for x ∈CA,x 6= xAB.
2. Onion-encrypt messages: For each message mx, let
ck+1 = mx, and let {mpki} be the mixing keys for chain
x ∈CA. For i = k to 1, generate a random value xi ∈ Zp,
and compute ci = (gxi ,AEnc(DH(mpki,xi),ρ,ci+1)).
Send c1 to chain x.
3. Fetch messages: At the end of the round, fetch and
decrypt the messages in her mailbox, using ADec with
matching sxA or sA = KDF(sAB,pkA).
messages (e.g., messages with all zeroes) using a secret key
known only to her, and submits them to the chosen chains.
If she is talking with another user Bob, then she first finds
where they intersect by computing the intersection of Bob’s
group and her group (§5.3.1). If there is more than one such
chain, then she breaks the tie by selecting the chain with the
smallest index. Alice then generates `− 1 loopback mes-
sages and one encrypted message using a secret key that Al-
ice and Bob shares. Finally, Alice sends the message for Bob
to the intersecting chain, and sends the loopback messages to
the other chains. Bob mirrors Alice’s actions.
5.3.3 User churn
Like servers, users might go offline in the middle of a
round, and XRD aims to provide privacy in such situations.
However, the protocol presented thus far does not achieve
this goal. If Alice and Bob are conversing and Alice goes of-
fline without Bob knowing, then Alice’s mailbox will receive
Bob’s message while Bob’s mailbox will get one fewer mes-
sage. Thus, by observing mailbox access counts and Alice’s
availability, the adversary can infer their communication.
To solve this issue, we require Alice to submit two sets of
messages in round ρ: the messages for the current round ρ ,
and cover messages for round ρ+1. If Alice is not commu-
nicating with anyone, then the cover messages will be loop-
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back messages. If Alice is communicating with another user,
then one of the cover messages will be a conversation mes-
sage indicating that Alice has gone offline.
If Alice goes offline in round τ , then the servers use the
cover messages submitted in τ−1 to carry out round τ . Now,
there are two possibilities. If Alice is not in a conversation,
then Alice’s cover loopback messages are routed in round τ ,
and nothing needs to happen afterwards. If Alice is convers-
ing with Bob, then at the end of round τ , Bob will get the
message that Alice is offline via one of the cover messages.
Starting from round τ + 1, Bob now sends loopback mes-
sages instead of conversation messages to hide the fact that
Bob was talking with Alice in previous rounds. This could be
used to end conversations as well. Malicious servers cannot
fool Bob into thinking Alice has gone offline by replacing
Alice’s messages with her cover messages because the hon-
est servers will ensure Alice’s real messages are accounted
for using our defenses described in §6.
6 Aggregate hybrid shuffle
Adversarial servers can tamper with the messages to leak
privacy in XRD. For example, consider a mix-net chain
where the first server is malicious. This malicious server
can replace Alice’s message with a message directed at Al-
ice. Then, at the end of the mixing, the adversary will make
one of two observations. If Alice was talking to another user
Bob, Bob will receive one fewer message while Alice would
receive two messages. The adversary would then learn that
Alice was talking to Bob. If Alice is not talking to anyone on
the tampered chain, then Alice would receive one message,
revealing the lack of conversation on that chain.
Prior works [14, 47, 31, 45, 30] have used traditional ver-
ifiable shuffles [39, 24, 8, 26] to prevent these attacks. At a
high level, verifiable shuffles allow the servers in the chain
(one of which is honest) to verify the correctness of a shuffle
of another server; namely, that the plaintexts underlying the
outputs of a server is a valid permutation of the plaintexts
underlying the inputs. Unfortunately, these techniques are
computationally expensive, requiring many exponentiations.
In XRD, we make an observation that help us avoid tra-
ditional verifiable shuffles. For a meaningful tampering, the
adversary necessarily has to tamper with the messages be-
fore they are shuffled by the honest server. Otherwise, the
adversary does not learn the origins of messages. For exam-
ple, after dropping a message in a server downstream from
the honest server, the adversary might observe that Alice did
not receive a message. The adversary cannot tell, however,
whether the dropped message was sent by Alice or another
user, and does not learn anything about Alice’s communica-
tion pattern. (Intuitively, the adversarial downstream servers
do not add any privacy in any case.) In this section, we de-
scribe a new form of verifiable shuffle we call aggregate hy-
brid shuffle (AHS) that allows us to take advantage of this
fact. In particular, the protocol guarantees that the honest
server will receive and shuffle all honest users’ messages,
or the honest server will detect that some parties upstream
(some servers or users) misbehaved. We will then describe
how the honest server can efficiently identify all malicious
users and servers who deviated from the protocol, without
affecting the privacy of honest users. The user and server
protocols remain largely the same as the baseline protocols
described in §5, with some crucial changes.
6.1 Key generation with AHS
When the chain is created, the servers generate three key
pairs: blinding key, mixing key, and inner key. The inner
keys are per-round keys, and each server i generates its own
inner key pair (ipki = giski , iski). The other two keys are
long-term keys, and are generated in order starting with the
first server in the chain. Let bpk0 = g. Starting with server
1, server i = 1, . . . ,k generates (bpki = bpk
bski
i−1 ,bski) and
(mpki = bpk
mski
i−1 ,mski) in order. In other words, the base
of the public keys of the server i is bpki−1 = g∏a<i bska . The
public mixing key of the last server, for example, would be
mpkk = bpk
mskk
k−1 = g
mskk·∏i<k bski . Each server also has to
prove to all other servers in zero-knowledge that it knows
the private keys that match the public keys. All public keys
are made available to all servers and users.
6.2 Sending messages with AHS
Once the servers’ keys are distributed, user Alice can sub-
mit a message to a chain. To do so, Alice now employs a
double-enveloping technique to encrypt her message [25]:
she first onion-encrypts her message for all servers using the
inner keys, and then onion-encrypts the result with the mix-
ing keys. Let inner ciphertext be the result of the first onion-
encryption, and outer ciphertext be the final ciphertext. The
inner ciphertexts are encrypted using ∏i ipki as the public
key, which allows users to onion-encrypt in “one-shot”: i.e.,
e = (gy,AEnc(DH(∏i ipki,y),ρ,m)) in round ρ with mes-
sage m and a random y (Without y, DH(∏i ipki,y) can only
be computed if all {iski} are known). To generate the outer
ciphertext, Alice performs the following.
1. Generate her outer Diffie-Hellman key: a random x∈Zp
and (gx,x).
2. Generate a NIZK that proves she knows x that matches
gx (using knowledge of discrete log proof [9]).
3. Let ck+1 = e, and let {mpki} for i ∈ [k] be the mixing
keys of the servers in the chain. For i = k to 1, compute
ci = AEnc(DH(mpki,x),ρ,ci+1).
c = (gx,c1) is the final outer ciphertext. This is nearly iden-
tical to Algorithm 2, except that the user does not generate
a fresh pair of Diffie-Hellman keys for each layer of encryp-
tion. To submit the message, Alice sends c and the NIZK to
all servers in the chain.
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6.3 Mixing with AHS
Before mixing begins in round ρ , the servers have
{c j = (X j1 = gx j ,c1 = AEnc(DH(mpk1,x j),ρ,c j2))}. The
servers first agree on the inputs for this round. This can be
done, for example, by sorting the users’ ciphertexts, hash-
ing them using a cryptographic hash function, and then
comparing the hashes. Then, starting with server 1, server
i = 1, . . . ,k perform the following:
1. Decrypt and shuffle: Similar to Algorithm 1, de-
crypt each message. Each message is of the
form (X ji ,c
j
i = AEnc(DH(mpki,x j),ρ,c
j
i+1). Thus,
(b j,c ji+1) = ADec(DH(X
j
i ,mski),ρ,c
j
i ). If any decryp-
tion fails (i.e., b j = 0 for some j), then mixing halts and
the server can start a blame protocol described in §6.4.
Randomly shuffle {c ji+1}.
2. Blind and shuffle: Blind the users’ Diffie-Hellman keys
{X ji }: X ji+1 = (X ji )bski for each j. Then, shuffle the keys
using the same permutation as the one used to shuffle the
ciphertexts.
3. Generate zero-knowledge proof: Generate a proof that
(∏ j X
j
i )
bski =∏ j X
j
i+1 by generating a NIZK that shows
log∏ j(X ji )
(∏ j X
j
i+1) = logbpki−1 bpki(= bski). Send the
NIZK with the shuffled {X ji+1} to all other servers in the
chain. All other servers verify this proof is valid using
the {X ji } they received previously, {X ji+1}, bpki−1, and
bpki.
4. Forward messages: If i < k, then send the shuffled
{(X ji+1,c ji+1)} to server i+1.
When the last server finishes shuffling and no server reports
any errors during mixing, our protocol guarantees that the
honest server mixed all the honest users’ messages success-
fully, meaning the users’ privacy was protected. At this
point, the servers reveal their private per-round inner keys
{iski}. With this, the last server can decrypt the inner cipher-
texts to recover the users’ messages.
To demonstrate the correctness of AHS (i.e., every mes-
sage is successfully delivered if every participant followed
the protocol), consider the key user j used to encrypt the
message intended for server i and the Diffie-Hellman key
server i receives. User j encrypts the message using the key
DH(mpki,x j) = g
x j ·mski∏a<i bska . The Diffie-Hellman key
server i receives is X ji = g
x j ·∏a<i bska . The key exchange then
results in DH(X ji ,mski) = g
mski·x j∏a<i bska , which is the same
as the one the user used.
Analysis. We now provide a brief security analysis of our
scheme. This scheme provides protection against honest-
but-curious adversaries as the inputs and outputs of an hon-
est server look random: If decisional Diffie-Hellman is hard,
then gx·bsk is indistinguishable from a random value given gx
and gbsk for random x and bsk. Thus, by observing {gx j}
(input) and {gxpi( j)·bsk} (output) of an honest server where pi
is the random permutation used to shuffle the messages, the
adversary does not learn anything about the relationships be-
tween the inputs and outputs.
We now provide a high level analysis that the honest server
will always detect tampering by an upstream adversary. The
detailed proof is shown in Appendix A. Let server h be the
honest server. First, since we only need to consider up-
stream adversaries, we will consider all upstream malicious
servers as one collective server with private blinding key
bskA = ∑i<h bski. For the adversary to successfully tamper,
it must generate {X jh} such that (∏X j1 )bskA =∏X jh (other-
wise it would fail the NIZK verification in step 3 of §6.3).
Let XT 6= /0 be the set of honest users whose messages were
tampered. The adversary cannot compute ((X j1 )
bskA)mskh for
j ∈ XT , the keys the users used to authenticate the mes-
sages, since Diffie-Hellman is hard. Thus, the adversary
must change the users’ Diffie-Hellman keys in order to gen-
erate authenticated ciphertexts that differ from the original
ciphertexts; i.e., (X j1 )
bskA 6= X jh for j ∈ XT . Moreover, be-
cause all decryption operations must be successful to avoid
detection, the adversary must know the keys used for authen-
ticated decryption, which are (X jh )
mskh for j ∈ XT .
In the beginning of a round, the adversary controlled
users have to prove the knowledge of discrete log of their
Diffie-Hellman keys after seeing {X j1 = gx j} from hon-
est users. Then, the adversarial users’ keys are gener-
ated independently of the honest users’. As a result,
the goal of the adversary is essentially to find {X jh} j∈XT
such that (∏ j∈XT X
j
1 )
bskA =∏ j∈XT X
j
h , with (X
j
1 )
bskA 6= X jh .
However, if the adversary could do so, then it could
also compute ((∏ j∈XT X
j
1 )
bskA)mskh =∏ j∈XT (X
j
h )
bskh , since
it knows (X jh )
mskh . This means that the adversary com-
puted ((∏ j∈XT X
j
1 )
bskA)mskh = gmskh·bskA·∑ j∈XT x j only given
{gx j} j∈XT , bskA, and (gbskA)mskh , where {x j} j∈XT and mskh
are random values independent of bskA. This breaks the
Diffie-Hellman assumption, and thus the adversary must not
be able to tamper with messages undetected.
6.4 Blame protocol
There are two ways an adversary could be detected: a
NIZK fails to verify or an authenticated decryption fails. If
a malicious user cannot generate a correct NIZK in step 2 in
§6.2 or if a malicious server misbehaves and cannot gener-
ate a correct NIZK in step 3 in §6.3, then the misbehavior
is detected and the adversary is immediately identified. In
the case where a server finds some misauthenticated cipher-
texts, the server can start a blame protocol that allows the
server to identify who misbehaved. At a high level, the pro-
tocol guarantees that users are identified if and only if they
purposefully sent misauthenticated ciphertexts. In addition,
the protocol ensures that the privacy of honest users always
remain protected, even if a malicious server tries to falsely
accuse honest users.
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Once server h identifies an misauthenticated ciphertext, it
starts the blame protocol by revealing the problem ciphertext
(X jh ,c
j
h). Then, the servers execute the following:
1. For i = h− 1, . . . ,1, the servers reveal in order X ji that
matches X ji+1 (i.e., (X
j
i )
bski = X ji+1). Each server proves
to all other servers it calculated X ji correctly by showing
that logX ji
(X ji+1) = logbpki−1(bpki)(= bski).
2. For i = h− 1, . . . ,1, the servers reveal in order c ji that
matches c ji+1 (i.e., c
j
i = AEnc(DH(X
j
i ,mski),ρ,c
j
i+1).
Each server proves it correctly decrypted the ciphertext
by revealing the key used for decryption (X ji )
mski , and
showing that logX ji
((X ji )
mski) = logbpki−1(mpki). The
other servers can verify the correctness of the decryp-
tion operation by checking the NIZK and decrypting the
ciphertext themselves.
3. All servers check that c j1 revealed by the first server
matches the user submitted ciphertext (from §6.2).
4. Similar to step 2, server h (the accusing server) reveals its
Diffie-Hellman exchanged key (X jh )
mskh , and shows that
logX jh
((X jh )
mskh) = logbpkh−1(mpkh). All servers verify
that ADec(kh,c
j
h) fails.
If there are multiple problem ciphertexts, the blame proto-
col can be carried out in parallel for each ciphertext. Steps 1
and 2 can be done simultaneously as well. If the servers suc-
cessfully carry out the blame protocol, then the servers have
identified actively malicious users. At this point, those ci-
phertexts are removed from the set, and the upstream servers
are required to repeat the AHS protocol; since the accusing
servers have already removed all bad ciphertexts, the servers
just have to repeat step 3 of §6.3 to show the keys were cor-
rectly computed. If any of the above steps fail, then the
servers delete their private inner keys.
Analysis. The accusing server and the upstream servers are
required to reveal the exchanged key used to decrypt the ci-
phertexts, and the correctness of the key exchange is proven
through the two NIZKs in step 1 and step 2. Then, all servers
(in particular, the honest server) can use the revealed keys to
ensure that the submitted original ciphertext decrypts to the
problem ciphertext. Thus, if a user submits misauthenticated
ciphertext, then the servers get a verifiable chain of decryp-
tion starting with the outer ciphertext to the problem cipher-
text, allowing the servers to identify the malicious user. (In-
tuitively, the outer ciphertext behaves as a commitment for
the all layers of encryption.) Moreover, if an honest user sub-
mits a correctly authenticated ciphertext, she will never be
accused successfully, since an honest user’s ciphertext will
authenticate at all layers. Thus, if a user is actively mali-
cious, then she will be identified and removed.
Finally, even after a false accusation, the users’ privacy is
protected. After a malicious server accuses an honest user,
the malicious server learns that either an outer ciphertext (if
the server is upstream of server h) or an inner ciphertext (if
the server is downstream of server h) originated from the
user. In either case, the message remains encrypted for the
honest server, by the mixing key in the former case or by the
inner key in the latter case. The blame protocol will fail when
the malicious server fails to prove that the honest user’s ci-
phertext is misauthenticated, and the ciphertext will never be
decrypted. As such, the adversary never learns the final des-
tination of the user’s message, and XRD protects the honest
users’ privacy.
7 Implementation
The XRD prototype is written in approximately 3,500
lines of Go. We used NaCl [6] for authenticated encryption,
which internally uses ChaCha20 and Poly1305. The servers
communicated using streaming gRPC over TLS. Our proto-
type assumes that the servers’ and users’ public keys, and
the public randomness for creating the chains are provided
by a higher level functionality. Finally, we set the number of
chains n equal to the number of servers N (§5.2.1).
8 Evaluation
In this section, we investigate the cost of users and the per-
formance of XRD for different network configurations. For
majority of our experiments, we assumed f = 0.2 (i.e., 80%
of the servers are honest) unless indicated otherwise. We
used 256 byte messages, similar to evaluations of prior sys-
tems [46, 45, 4]; this is about the size of a standard SMS mes-
sage or a Tweet. We used c4.8xlarge instances on Amazon
EC2 for our experiments, which has 36 Intel Xeon E5-2666
CPUs with 60 GB of memory and 10 Gbps links.
We compare the results against three prior systems: Sta-
dium [45]1 Atom [30], and Pung [4, 3]. For Stadium, we
report the performance for eε = 10 (meaning the probability
of Alice talking with Bob is within 10× the probability of
Alice talking with any other user) and allow up to 10,000
rounds of communication with strong security guarantees
(δ < 10−4), which are the parameters the used for evaluation
in their paper. We show results for Pung with XPIR (used in
the original paper [4]) and with SealPIR (used in the follow-
up work [3]) when measuring user overheads, and only with
XPIR when measuring end-to-end latency. We do this be-
cause SealPIR significantly improves the client performance
and enables more efficient batch messaging, but introduces
extra server overheads in the case of one-to-one messaging.
As mentioned in §2, the three systems scale horizon-
tally, but offer different security properties from XRD. To
summarize, Stadium provides differential privacy guarantees
against the same adversary assumed by XRD. Stadium users
can exchange up to 10,000 sensitive messages with strong
privacy, while XRD users can do so for unlimited messages.
1We did not compare against Karaoke [33] which is significantly faster
than Stadium [45] since the implementation is not yet available.
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Figure 2: Required user bandwidth per round as a function
of number of servers in the network.
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Figure 3: Required user computation as a function of number
of servers with a single core. The computation could easily
be parallelized with more cores for XRD.
Atom provides cryptographic sender anonymity [40] under
the same threat model. Finally, Pung provides messaging
with cryptographic privacy against a stronger adversary who
can compromise all servers rather than a fraction of servers.
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any scal-
able private messaging systems that offer the same security
guarantee under a similar threat model to XRD.
8.1 User costs
We first characterize computation and bandwidth over-
heads of XRD users using a single core of a c4.8xlarge in-
stance. In order to ensure that every pair of users intersects,
each user sends
√
2N messages (§5.3.1). This means that
the overheads for users increase as we add more servers to
the network, as shown in Figure 2 and 3. This is a primary
weakness of XRD, since our horizontal scalability comes at a
higher cost for users. Still, the cost remains reasonable even
for large numbers of servers. With 100 XRD servers, each
user must submit about 54 KB of data. The bandwidth usage
increases to about 238 KB of data with 2,000 servers. For
1 minute rounds, this translates to about 40 Kbps of band-
width requirement. A similar trend exists for computation
overhead as well, though it also remains relatively small: it
takes less than 0.5 seconds with fewer than 2,000 servers in
the network. This could be easily parallelized with more
cores, since the messages for different chains are indepen-
dently generated. The cover messages make up half of the
client overhead (§5.3.3).
User costs in prior works do not increase with the num-
ber of servers. Still, Pung with XPIR incurs heavy user
bandwidth overheads due to the cost of PIR. With 1 million
users, Pung users transmit about 5.8 MB, which is about 25×
worse than XRD when there are fewer than 2,000 servers.
Moreover, per user cost of XPIR is proportional to the to-
tal number of users (O(
√
M) for M users): the bandwidth
cost increases to 11 MB of bandwidth for 4 million users.
The SealPIR variant, however, is comparable to that of XRD,
as the users can compress the communication using crypto-
graphic techniques. Finally, Stadium and Atom incur mini-
mal user bandwidth cost, with less than a kilobyte of band-
width overhead. Thus, for users with heavily limited re-
sources in a large network, prior works can be more desir-
able than XRD. Lowering the user bandwidth cost in XRD
so that it is comparable to prior systems is an interesting fu-
ture direction.
8.2 End-to-end latency
Experiment setup. To evaluate the end-to-end perfor-
mance, we created a testbed consisting of up to 200
c4.8xlarge instances. We ran the instances within the same
data center to avoid bandwidth costs, but added 40-100ms of
round trip latency between servers using the Linux tc com-
mand to simulate a more realistic distributed network.
We used many c4.8xlarge instances to simulate millions
of users, and also used ten more c4.8xlarge instances to sim-
ulate the mailboxes. We generate all users’ messages before
the round starts, and measure the critical path of our system
by measuring the time between the last user submitting her
message and the last user downloading her message.
We estimate the latency of Pung with M users and N
servers by evaluating it on a single c4.8xlarge instance with
M/N users. This is the best possible latency Pung can
achieve because (1) Pung is embarrassingly parallel, so
evenly dividing users across all the servers should be ideal [4,
§7.3], and (2) we are ignoring the extra work needed for
coordination between the servers (e.g., for message replica-
tion). For Stadium, we report the latency when the length of
each mix chain is nine servers.
We focus on the following questions in this section, and
compare against prior work:
• What is the end-to-end latency of XRD, and how does it
change with the number of users?
• How does XRD scale with more servers?
• What is the effect of f , the fraction of malicious servers,
on latency?
• What is the impact of the blame protocol on perfor-
mance?
Number of users. Figure 4 shows the end-to-end latency of
XRD and prior works with 100 servers. XRD was able to
handle 1 million users in 128 seconds, and the latency scales
linearly with the number of users. This is 12× and 2.1×
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Figure 4: End-to-end latency of XRD and prior systems with
varying numbers of users with 100 servers.
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Figure 5: End-to-end latency of XRD for varying numbers
of servers with 2 million users. We show Pung and Atom on
a different time scale.
faster than Atom and Pung, and 2× worse than Stadium for
the same deployment scenario. Though processing a single
message in XRD is significantly faster than doing so in Sta-
dium (since Stadium relies on verifiable shuffle, while XRD
uses AHS), the overall system is still slower. This is be-
cause each XRD user submits many messages. For example,
each user submits 15 messages with 100 servers, which is
almost equivalent to adding 15 users who each submit one
message. Unfortunately, the performance gap would grow
with more servers due to each user submitting more mes-
sages (the rate at which the gap grows would be proportional
to
√
2N). While XRD cannot provide the same performance
as Stadium with large numbers of users and servers, XRD
can provide stronger cryptographic privacy.
When compared to Pung, the speed-up increases further
with the number of users since the latency of Pung grows
superlinearly. This is because the server computation per
user increases with the number of users. With 2 and 4 million
users, for example, XRD is 3.7× and 7.1× faster. For Atom,
the latency increases linearly, but the performance gap still
increases with more users. This is due to its heavy reliance
on expensive public key cryptography and long routes for the
messages (over 300 servers).
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Figure 6: Latency of XRD for different values of f .
Scalability. Figure 5 shows how the latency decreases with
the number of servers with 2 million users. We experi-
mented with up to 200 servers, and observed the expected
scaling pattern: the latency of XRD reduces as
√
2/N with
N servers (§4.2). In contrast, prior works scale as 1/N, and
thus will outperform XRD with enough servers. Still, be-
cause XRD employs more efficient cryptography, XRD out-
performs Atom and Pung with less than 200 servers.
To estimate the performance of larger deployments, we
extrapolated our results to more servers. We estimate that
XRD can support 2 million users with 1,000 servers in about
84s, while Stadium can do so in about 8s. (At this point,
the latency between servers would be the dominating factor
for Stadium.) This gap increases with more users, as de-
scribed previously. For Atom and Pung, we estimate that
the latency would be comparable to XRD with about 3,000
servers and 1,000 servers in the network, respectively, for
2 million users. Pung would need more servers with more
users to catch up to XRD due to the superlinear increase in
latency with the number of users.
Impact of f . During setup, the system administrator should
make a conservative estimate of the fraction of malicious
servers f to form the groups. Larger f affects latency be-
cause it increases in the length of the chains k (§5.2.1). Con-
cretely, with n = 100, k must satisfy 100 · f k < 2−64. Thus,
k > log(2
−64/100)
log( f ) , which means that the length of a chain
(and the latency) grows as a function of −1log( f ) . Figure 6
demonstrates this effect. This function grows rapidly when
f >> 0.5, and thus the latency would be significantly worse
when considering larger values of f . Atom would experi-
ence the same effect since its mix chains are created using
the same strategy as XRD. Stadium would face more signifi-
cant increase in latency with f as its mix chains also similarly
get longer with f , and the length of the chains has a super-
linear effect on the latency due to expensive zero-knowledge
proof verification [45, §10.3]. The latency of Pung does not
increase with f since it already assumes f = 1.
Impact of blame protocol. The performance shown in Fig-
ure 4 and Figure 5 assume that no misbehavior was detected.
While malicious users by themselves cannot deny service,
they could send misauthenticated ciphertexts in an attempt
to trigger the blame protocol, and slow down the protocol.
Since malicious users are removed from the network when
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Figure 8: Fraction of conversations that fail in a given round
due to server failures for different server churn rates.
detected, they cause the most slowdown when the misauthen-
ticated ciphertexts are at the last server. The performance of
blame protocol also depends on how many users were caught
this round. We therefore show the worst case latency in-
crease due to blame protocol as a function of number of ma-
licious users in a chain in Figure 7 with f = 0.2. The blame
protocol requires two discrete log equivalence proof and de-
cryption per user for each layer of encryption. Concretely, if
5,000 users misbehave in a chain, the blame protocol takes
about 13 seconds to finish. This cost increases linearly with
the number of users. For example, if 100,000 users mis-
behave in a chain blame protocol takes about 150 seconds.
(The later case, for example, corresponds to when a third of
all users are malicious with 100 servers and 2 million users in
the network.) While this is a significant increase in latency,
malicious users can be removed from the network once ma-
licious users are detected. Thus, to cause serious slowdowns
across many rounds, the adversary needs large amounts of
resources in order to constantly create new malicious users.
Moreover, XRD remains at least 6× and 2× faster than Atom
and Pung even with 100,000 malicious users in a chain. The
faster version of Atom used for comparison in this paper (the
trap message variant) does not protect against malicious user
denial-of-service. Protecting against adversarial users would
require at least 4× slowdown for Atom [30, §6].
8.3 Availability
To estimate the effect of server churn on a XRD network,
we simulated deployment scenarios with 2 million users and
different numbers of servers. We assumed that all users were
in a conversation, and show the fraction of the users whose
conversation messages did not reach their partner in Fig-
ure 8. For example, if 1% of the servers fail in a given round
(comparable to server churn rate in Tor [1]), then we expect
about 27% of the conversations to experience failure, and
the end-points would have to resend their conversation mes-
sages. Unfortunately, the failure rate quickly increases with
the server churn rates, reaching 70% with 4% server fail-
ures, as more chains contain at least one failing server. Thus,
it would be easy for the adversary who controls a non-trivial
fraction of the servers to launch a denial-of-service attack.
Addressing this concern remains important future work.
When compared to Pung, the availability guarantees can
be significantly worse, assuming Pung replicates all users’
messages across all servers. In this case, the server churn
rate would be equal to the user failure rate with users evenly
distributed across all Pung servers, and the users connected
to failing servers could be rerouted to other servers to con-
tinue communication. Atom can tolerate any fraction γ of
the servers failing using threshold cryptography [17], but
the latency grows with γ . For example, to tolerate γ = 1%
servers failing, we estimate that Atom would be about 10%
slower [30, Appendix B]. Finally, Stadium uses two layers
of parallel mix-nets (i.e., each layer is similar to XRD), and
fully connects the chains across the two layers. As a re-
sult, even one server failure would cause the whole system
to come to a halt. (Stadium does not provide a fault recovery
mechanism, and the security implications of continuing the
protocol without the failing chains are not analyzed [45].)
9 Discussion and future work
Multi-user conversations. In this paper, we focused on pro-
viding private one-to-one conversations. A natural extension
would be to provide group conversations. XRD can already
provide group conversations in scenarios where the users in
a group chat intersect at different chains. For example, con-
sider three users Alice, Bob, and Charlie who wish to have a
private group conversation. If (Alice, Bob), (Alice, Charlie),
and (Bob, Charlie) all intersect at different chains, then each
user could carry out one-to-one conversation on two differ-
ent chains to have a group conversation. The same mecha-
nism can be used to have multiple one-to-one conversations
as well. This could help amortize the cost per conversation
since more than one of
√
2n messages would carry conver-
sation messages. However, XRD currently cannot support
multiple conversations for one user if she intersects with dif-
ferent partners at the same chain (e.g., Alice intersects with
Bob and Charlie on the same chain). We wish to generalize
XRD to multi-user conversations in the future.
Values of ` and load distribution. As discussed in §4, the
number of chains each user selects is `≥√N, and our chain
selection algorithm in §5.3.1 is a √2-approximation algo-
rithm. It maybe possible, however, to find a better algorithm
that yields lower `, closer to
√
N. This would result in pro-
portional speed-up of XRD, up to
√
2× faster. Furthermore,
since XRD only requires that all users intersect, we need not
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use the same ` for all users, or evenly distribute the load
across all chains. If different users and chains have differ-
ent capacities, it may be beneficial for performance to vary `
per user with uneven distribution of messages.
10 Conclusion
XRD provides a unique design point in the space of meta-
data private communication systems by achieving crypto-
graphic privacy and horizontal scalability using efficient
cryptographic primitives. XRD organizes the servers into
multiple small chains that process messages in parallel, and
can scale easily with the number of servers by adding more
chains. We hide users’ communication patterns by ensur-
ing every user is equally likely to be talking to any other
user, and hiding the origins of users’ messages through mix-
nets. We then protect against active attacks efficiently using
a novel technique called aggregate hybrid shuffle. Our eval-
uation on a network of 100 servers demonstrates that XRD
can support 2 million users in 251 seconds, which is more
than 3.7× faster than prior works with similar guarantees.
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A Security of aggregate hybrid shuffle
The adversary’s goal is to have an upstream server suc-
cessfully tamper with some messages without getting de-
tected by the honest server. To model this, we consider the
following security game between three parties: the client,
the adversary, and the verifier. All parties are given the total
number of users M. The client controls users in set XH ⊂ [M]
(this models the honest users), and the adversary controls
users in set XA = [M]\XH . In addition, the adversary controls
servers 1, . . . ,h−1, and the verifier controls server h (i.e., the
honest server). To simplify the presentation, we assume the
adversary uses the identity permutation for all servers, but it
is easy to adapt this proof to any arbitrary permutation.
1. The adversary sends the client and the verifier the pub-
lic keys bpki and mpki and ipki for i = 1, . . . ,h− 1. It
also generates NIZKs to prove that it knows the val-
ues bski = logbpki−1(bpki) and mski = logbpki−1(mpki)
for i = 1, . . . ,h− 1, where bpk0 = g. It sends the pub-
lic keys and NIZKs to the verifier.
2. The verifier verifies the NIZKs. The verifier
then generates the key pairs (bpkh = bpk
bskh
i−1 ,bskh),
(mpkh = bpk
mskh
i−1 ,mskh), and (ipkh, iskh), and sends the
public keys to the client and the adversary.
3. The client generates random {x j} j∈XH , and
{c j = (X j1 = gx j ,c j1)} j∈XH using the protocol de-
scribed in §6.2. It also generates a NIZK that it knows
corresponding to x j for each j, and sends both c j and
the NIZK to the adversary and the verifier.
4. The adversary generates its input messages
{c j = (X j1 ,c j1)} j∈XA (not necessarily by following
the protocol in §6.2). It generates a NIZK that shows it
knows the discrete log of X j1 and sends {c j} j∈XA and the
NIZKs to the client and the verifier.
5. The verifier verifies all NIZKs.
6. For i = 1, . . . ,h− 1, the adversary sends the verifier
{X ji+1} j∈[M], and a NIZK that shows(
M
∏
j=1
X ji
)bski
=
M
∏
j=1
X ji+1
by proving that
log∏Mj=1 X
j
i
(
M
∏
j=1
X ji+1
)
= logbpki−1(bpki) .
It also sends the ciphertexts {c jh
′} to the verifier.
7. The verifier verifies all NIZKs, and checks that
ADec((X jh )
mskh ,c jh
′
) = (1, ·) for all j ∈ [M].
The game halts if the verifier fails to verify any NIZKs or
authenticated decryption ever fails (i.e., returns (0, ·)). The
adversary wins the game if the game does not halt and it has
successfully tampered with some messages. In other words,
the adversary wins if
1.
(
∏Mj=1 X
j
i
)bski
=∏Mj=1 X
j
i+1 for all i = 1, . . . ,h−1,
2. there exists XT ⊂ XH such that for all j ∈ XT ,
(X j1 )
∏i<h bski 6= X jh and |XT |> 0,
3. and ADec((X jh )
mskh ,c jh
′
) = (1, ·) for all j ∈ [M].
We will now show that if the adversary can win this
game, then it can also break Diffie-Hellman. Assume the
adversary won the game. Let bskA = ∏i<h bski be the
product of the private blinding key of the adversary. If
the adversary won, then the first condition implies that
(∏Mj=1 X
j
1 )
bskA =∏Mj=1 X
j
h . Now, consider three boolean
predicates for each j ∈ [M]: c jh
?
= c jh
′
, (X j1 )
bskA ?= X jh , and
KNOW((X jh )
mskh), where KNOW(x) = 1 if the adversary
knows (or can compute) x, and 0 otherwise. There are eight
possible combinations of the predicates, and we consider
each combination for j ∈ XH . We indicate which combina-
tions are possible for the adversary to satisfy, given that all
authenticated decryptions were successful.
1. c jh 6= c jh
′
, (X j1 )
bskA 6= X jh , KNOW((X jh )mskh) = 0: IM-
POSSIBLE. Since the adversary does not know the key
used to decrypt (i.e., (X jh )
mskh ), it cannot generate a valid
ciphertext.
2. c jh 6= c jh
′
, (X j1 )
bskA 6=X jh , KNOW((X jh )mskh) = 1: POSSI-
BLE. Since the adversary knows the key used to decrypt
it could generate a valid ciphertext.
3. c jh 6= c jh
′
, (X j1 )
bskA = X jh , KNOW((X
j
h )
mskh) = 0: IM-
POSSIBLE. Same argument as case 1.
4. c jh 6= c jh
′
, (X j1 )
bskA = X jh , KNOW((X
j
h )
mskh) = 1: IM-
POSSIBLE. If possible, then the adversary can break
the Diffie-Hellman assumption. Namely, given only
X j1 = g
x j , bskA, and (gbskA)mskh for random x j and mskh
and an independently generated bskA, it can compute
(X jh )
mskh = gx j ·bskA·mskh . If this were possible, then given
ga and gb for random a and b, the adversary could gen-
erate an bskA, compute (gb)bskA , and compute ga·b·bskA .
It could then break the Diffie-Hellman assumption and
compute gab by raising ga·b·bskA to bsk−1A .
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5. c jh = c
j
h
′
, (X j1 )
bskA 6= X jh , KNOW((X jh )mskh) = 0: IM-
POSSIBLE. If possible, then c jh authenticates under two
different keys (X j1 )
bskA·mskh and (X jh )
mskh . However, the
probability of this is negligible (§3).
6. c jh = c
j
h
′
, (X j1 )
bskA 6= X jh , KNOW((X jh )mskh) = 1: IM-
POSSIBLE. Same argument as case 5.
7. c jh = c
j
h
′
, (X j1 )
bskA = X jh , KNOW((X
j
h )
mskh) = 0: POS-
SIBLE. This corresponds to untampered messages.
8. c jh = c
j
h
′
, (X j1 )
bskA = X jh , KNOW((X
j
h )
mskh) = 1: IM-
POSSIBLE. Same argument as case 4.
Thus, there are two possible combinations of predicates:
(c jh 6= c jh
′
, (X j1 )
bskA 6= X jh , KNOW((X jh )mskh) = 1) and (c jh =
c jh
′
, (X j1 )
bskA = X jh , KNOW((X
j
h )
mskh) = 0). The first combi-
nation corresponds exactly to XT (tampered messages), and
the second corresponds exactly to XH \XT (untampered mes-
sages).
Similarly, consider j ∈ XA. The adversary generates the
ciphertexts {c jh
′} for the verifier. Thus, the adversary must
know (X jh )
mskh , the key used to authenticate the ciphertext,
for j ∈ XA.
Now, we consider the product of the users’ Diffie-Hellman
keys. Because all NIZKs have to be verified, we have that(
M
∏
j=1
X j1
)bskA
=
(
M
∏
j=1
X jh
)
.
Consider XU = XH \ XT , i.e., the set of messages that did
not change. Then, we can divide both sides by the values
associated with XU since (X
j
1 )
bskA = X jh for j ∈ XU :(
∏
j∈XT∪XA
X j1
)bskA
=
(
∏
j∈XT∪XA
X jh
)
,
since XT ∪XA = [M]\XU . We can rewrite this as(
∏
j∈XT
X j1
)bskA
=
(
∏
j∈XT∪XA
X jh
)
/
(
∏
j∈XA
X j1
)bskA
. (1)
Based on our analysis of the possible predicates for XT and
XA, the adversary must know (X
j
h )
mskh for j ∈ XT ∪ XA.
Moreover, the adversary knows logg(X
j
1 ) for j ∈ XA (it was
required to prove the knowledge in step 4 of the game).
Thus, the adversary can compute ((X j1 )
bskA)mskh by com-
puting ((gbskA)mskh)logg(X
j
1 ) for j ∈ XA (it knows mpkh =
(gbskA)mskh ). As a result, it can compute(
∏
j∈XT∪XA
(
X jh
)mskh)
/ ∏
j∈XA
((
X j1
)bskA)mskh
.
This, however, is(
∏
j∈XT∪XA
(
X jh
)mskh)
/ ∏
j∈XA
((
X j1
)bskA)mskh
=
( ∏
j∈XT∪XA
X jh
)
/
(
∏
j∈XA
X j1
)bskAmskh
=
(∏
j∈XT
X j1
)bskAmskh ,
where the last step uses the equality from equation 1. This
means that given {X j1 = gx j}, bskA, and (gbskA)mskh for
random {x j} and mskh, and bskA that was generated in-
dependently of mskh, the adversary was able to compute
gbskA·mskh·∑ j∈XT x j .
However, such an adversary can also break Diffie-
Hellman. To see how, consider the following adversary ADH
that tries to break Diffie-Hellman. ADH is given ga and
gb for random a and b, and is asked to compute gab. To
compute this, ADH plays the above game setting gx1 = ga
and mpkh = (gbskA)b = (gb)bskA for bskA of its choosing,
and then simulates the client by generating many random
x j for j ∈ XH \ {1}. At the end of the game, the ad-
versary will have gbskA·b·(a+∑ j∈XT , j 6=1 x j). Since the adver-
sary knows bskA and x j for j 6= 1, j ∈ XT , it can compute
gab = (gbskA·b·(a+∑ j∈XT , j 6=1 x j))bsk
−1
A /(gb)∑ j∈XT , j 6=1 x j . Thus, it
can break Diffie-Hellman. Therefore, the adversary cannot
win the above game if Diffie-Hellman is hard, meaning that
it could satisfy at most two out of the three conditions to win
the game. In turn, this implies that the honest server will
always catch an upstream malicious server misbehaving.
B Security game and proof sketches
We define the security of our system using the following
security game played between a challenger and an adversary.
Both the challenger and the adversary are given the set of
users [M] = {1,2, . . . ,M}, the set of servers [N], the fraction
f of servers the adversary can compromise, and the number
of chains n.
1. The adversary selects the set of malicious servers
As ⊂ [N] such that |As| ≤ f ·N, and the set of malicious
users Ac ⊂ [M] such that |Ac| ≤ M− 2. The adversary
sends As and Ac to the challenger. Let Hs = [M]\As and
Hc = [N]\Ac denote the set of honest servers and users.
2. The challenger computes the size of each chain k as a
function of f and n, as described in §5.2. Then, it cre-
ates n mix chains by repeatedly sampling k servers per
group at random. The challenger sends the chain config-
urations to the adversary.
3. The adversary and the challenger generate blinding keys,
mixing keys, and inner keys as described in §6.1 and Ap-
pendix A.
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4. The adversary picks some honest users Ht ⊂Hc such that
|Ht | ≥ 2. It generates sets of chains {Cx} for x ∈ Ht
such that Cx ∩Cy 6= /0 for all x,y ∈ Ht . For c ∈ [n], let
Uc = {x ∈ Ht : c ∈Cx}. For each chain c, it also gener-
ates the potential messages {mcxy} for x,y∈Uc where mcxy
is the message that may be sent from user x to user y in
chain c. The adversary sends Ht , {{mcxy}}, and {Cx} to
the challenger.
5. The challenger first verifies that every pair of Cx and Cy
intersects at least once. If this is not the case, the game
halts. The challenger then performs the following for
each chain c ∈ [n]. First, it creates conversation pairs for
each chain c {(Xi,Yi)c} ⊂ Uc×Uc at random such that
every x ∈Uc appears in exactly one of the pairs. In other
words, every user has a unique conversation partner per
chain. (If Xi = Yi, then that user is talking with her-
self.) For each (x,y) ∈ {(Xi,Yi)c}, the challenger onion-
encrypts the messages mcxy from x to y and m
c
yx from y to
x with the keys of servers in chain c. Then, it uses the
protocol described in §6.2 to submit the ciphertexts and
the necessary NIZKs.
6. The adversary generates inputs to the chains for the users
in Ac, and sends them to the chains.
7. The challenger and the adversary take turns processing
the messages in each chain. Within a chain, they perform
the following for i = 1, . . . ,k:
(a) If server i∈Hs, the challenger performs protocol de-
scribed in §6.3 to shuffle and decrypt the messages,
and also generate an AHS proof. The challenger then
sends the proof to the adversary, and the resulting
messages to the owner of server i+1.
(b) If server i ∈ As, the adversary generates some mes-
sages along with an AHS proof. Then, sends the
AHS proof to the challenger, and sends the messages
to the owner of server i+1.
The challenger verifies all AHS proofs.
8. The challenger and the adversary decrypt the final result
of the shuffle (i.e., the inner ciphertexts).
9. The challenger samples a random bit b ← 0,1. If
b = 0, then send the adversary {(Xi,Yi)c} for c ∈ [n].
If b = 1, then sample random conversation pairs
{(X ′i ,Y ′i )c} ⊂Uc×Uc for each chain with the same con-
straint as in step 5, and send the adversary the newly
sampled pairs.
10. The adversary makes a guess b′ for b.
The adversary wins the game if the game does not come to a
halt before the last step and b′ = b. The adversary need not
follow the protocol described in this paper. The advantage of
the adversary in this game is |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |. We say that the
system provides metadata private communication if the ad-
vantage is negligible in the implicit security parameter. Note
that this game models a stronger version of XRD, which al-
lows users to communicate with multiple users on different
chains (i.e., what is described in §9), rather than only one
user. We could change the game slightly to force the chal-
lenger to send loopback messages in step 5 to model having
just one conversation.
Proof sketches. First, we argue that the adversary needs to
tamper with messages prior to the last honest server shuf-
fling, as stated in §6. To see why, consider an adversary that
only tampers with the messages after the last honest server.
The adversary can learn the recipients of all messages, but
not the senders. As a result, the adversary does not learn
anything about whether two users x,y ∈ Uc received mes-
sages because there exists a conversation pair (x,y)c, or be-
cause there were two conversation pairs (x,x)c and (y,y)c.
This means that any set of conversation pairs is equally likely
to be sampled by the challenger from the adversary’s view,
meaning that the adversary does not gain any advantage.
Thus, we consider an adversary who tampers with messages
prior to the honest server processing the messages.
In this scenario, the adversary in step 7 must follow the
protocol (e.g., no tampering with the messages), as analyzed
in Appendix A. Given this restriction, we now argue that the
adversary does not learn anything after playing the security
game by describing how a simulator of an adversary could
simulate the whole game with only the public inputs and the
private values of the adversary.
The simulator can simulate step 3 by generating random
public keys. It can simulate step 5 by generating random
values in place of the ciphertexts that encrypt the users’ mes-
sages {{mcxy}}, since the ciphertexts are indistinguishable
from random. It then randomly matches a user in Uc to
one of the generated random values for each chain c, and
sets the destination of each message as the matched user. It
onion-encrypts the final message using the randomly gener-
ated public keys and the adversary’s public keys. In step 7,
the adversary simulates the challenger by randomly permut-
ing the messages, and removing a layer of the encryption
from the messages. (It can remove a layer of encryption
since it knows all layers of onion-encryption.) Finally, it
could simulate the challenger’s last challenge by picking sets
of randomly generated conversation pairs, subject to the con-
straints in step 5. The distribution of the messages generated
and exchanged in the security game and in the simulator are
indistinguishable for a computationally limited adversary.
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